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         Transition as an Inter-
The energy transition resembles an in-
ter-generational contract in which the 
current generation pre-finances a gradu-
al replacement of the entire fossil and 
nuclear energy system in the 21st cen-
tury with energy eciency, energy sav-
ing and renewable energies, and organ-
ises the implementation processes in 
order to protect children, grandchildren, 
future generations and developing coun-
tries and its peoples from the risks of a 
non-renewable energy system. Moreo-
ver, this is a way to avoid the major risks 
of resource wars over oil or catastrophic 
nuclear accidents in the long run. This 
progress project is visionary but su-
ciently concrete to be perceived as a fea-
sible and globally generalisable progress 
for the quality of life of people in Europe 
and elsewhere. 
A “genuine energy transition” means the 
transformation to a completely decar-
bonised, risk-minimised, and above all, 
nuclear energy-free energy system that’s 
socially and economically compatible. 
1 This chapter is based on the book Hennicke 
et al. , Die Energiewende in Europa, 
published by Oekom-Verlag. A vision of 
progress, Munich (2019). The authors thank 
Jochen Luhmann, Stefan Thomas and 
Michael Müller for important information. 
Lisa Kolde and Lea Krings gave us great 
support in the editing.
1. The Energy 
   Generational Contract1
Europe needs a new vision of progress integrated into a general social-ecological reform concept.
A Europeanisation of the energy system transformation is fundamental for this. It is a necessary, 
if not su  cient, step towards more comprehensive reforms. And it implies a story about a positive 
social-ecological reform vision, which can be majority capable and give the “European idea” a 
future-oriented content. 
––––––––
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This vision for the energy system is a 
prerequisite, a driver for enough climate 
and resource protection, and a socio-
ecological modernisation project. It im-
plies an extremely ambitious and histori-
cally unique process that will last for 
decades—at least until the middle of the 
21st century. Such a far-reaching trans-
formation process requires a radical 
change of direction in modes of produc-
tion and consumption as well as a politi-
cal leap in quality towards more democ-
ratisation of energy policy and economy. 
The basic question is whether and how 
the principle of private capital utilisa-
tion and capitalist world market compe-
tition can be reconciled with social ob-
jectives. If the project fails, then the 
future reform capability of the economy 
and politics in and beyond global capi-
talism is generally questioned. 
It is not certain that a transformation of 
the European energy system will suc-
ceed in this sense, but essential steps in 
the right direction have been taken. 
That’s why it seems promising to fight 
for it in words and deeds. A real progress 
project can only succeed if the national 
and international connections between 
the social and ecological crisis are un-
derstood and integrated solution strate-
gies are developed and implemented. At 
the World Climate Conference in Kato-
wice (COP 24 in December 2018), UN 
Secretary-General António Guterres de-
scribed the worldwide hesitant climate 
protection policy not only as “immoral” 
but also as “suicidal” for humanity. Ac-
cording to the latest scientific findings 
(Steen et al. 2018), this is no rhetorical 
exaggeration. The word of the year 2018 
is also “hot age” which in popular scien-
tific form brings the weather extremes of 
the year 2018 into the context of a con-
ceivable catastrophic climate change. 
These dimensions of climate change, 
which pose a threat to humanity, throw 
a spotlight on all other areas of society. 
In this respect, they also determine the 
contexts for solutions to the social crisis.
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2. Politics Must Shape
The short-term and segmented analyses 
of traditional policy areas correspond to 
an often reactive, structurally conserva-
tive and short term market-oriented pol-
icy that is no longer compatible with the 
developing policy style in the fields of cli-
mate, resource and environmental poli-
cy, which is oriented towards key objec-
tives and the long term. From an economic 
point of view, an ambitious climate and 
resource protection policy that is orient-
ed towards key objectives means an an-
nounced, state-accelerated economic 
structural change, the opportunities and 
challenges of which, however, are not 
suciently analysed and therefore, in-
adequately designed to be precautionary, 
socially and economically compatible. 
If one defines sustainability as “not pro-
ducing and consuming at the expense of 
environment, social justice and future 
generations”, then this formulates a high 
scientific and political claim. But time is 
our scarcest factor. In this respect, prag-
matic and goal-oriented implementation 
takes precedence over contemplative 
reasoning. The urgency of climate and 
resource protection does not allow a de-
lay in action any more than does the 
need for rapid intervention against the 
worsening distribution and democracy 
crisis. Eective, socially acceptable and 
long-term goal-congruent reforms are in-
dispensable. 
So far, economic and fi scal policies have had a time horizon of political and economic 
“business cycles” of a few years; the interaction with long-term eco-social trends is not 
systematically included.
––––––––
                   the Long Term
The Hubbard Glacier in Alaska Bush fi re in California
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3. Lessons from the German  
On the other hand, the expansion of re-
newable power generation, the ambi-
tious goals of the energy transition con-
cept, and Germany’s phasing out of 
nuclear power are still exemplary. A suc-
cessful European energy transition re-
quires a joint initiative and alliance of 
several countries, ideally fuelled by the 
two economically strongest and neigh-
bourly countries: France and Germany. 
Today’s ocial German energy transi-
tion policy has had a long socio-political 
lead since the mid-1980s. Its momentum 
has long been based on the anti-nuclear 
movement, which later associated itself 
with a pro-renewable, and more recent-
ly, with a pro-energy-eciency move-
ment and was supported by a growing 
number of scientific studies.
The nuclear catastrophes in Chernobyl 
and Fukushima intensified the energy 
transition, which —after the unification 
of the two German states—became 
probably the most important future Ger-
man project of the 21st century. The 
term “Energiewende” became the de-
clared trademark of German energy pol-
icy. It was initially admired worldwide 
but is now increasingly viewed with 
scepticism because the “revolutionary 
goals” (Angela Merkel) of the German 
Energy Concept 2010/2011 are not be-
ing implemented decisively enough.
The German energy transition policy o ers illustrative material on the opportunities and 
defi cits of an energy transition. As the economically strongest EU Member State, Germany is 
currently slowing down a more ambitious European framework (e.g. in the mobility sector).
––––––––
      Energy Transition
The Reactor No. 4 of 
the Chernobyl Nuclear 
Power Plant after the 
accident in 1986
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3.1 “Revolutionary targets” 
(Angela Merkel)
In September 2010, the German govern-
ment adopted an energy concept for the 
energy transition and supplemented it 
after the catastrophe at Fukushima in 
2011. With far-reaching quantified tar-
gets, a drastic reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions, a massive expansion of 
renewable energies, and an absolute re-
duction in total energy consumption by 
50% by 2050—including sectoral targets 
for existing buildings and the transport 
sector—previously considered impossi-
ble were laid down.
Figure 1 compiles the objectives and the 
reductions achieved so far according to 
the sixth monitoring report of the Fed-
eral Government (BMWi 2018).
In the spring of 2011, the disaster with 
Fukushima Daiichi’s nuclear reactor 
tragically demonstrated the technologi-
cal hubris of the nuclear industry. It be-
came clear to many that there could be 
other conceivable causes for a prolonged 
power outage anywhere in the world, 
transforming the technical master-
piece—a nuclear power plant—into a 
disaster machine.
In June 2011, the Federal Government, 
under pressure from public opinion, re-
acted with the Energy Transition deci-
sions. The extension of the running 
times was revoked and a timetable for 
the final nuclear phase-out until 2022 
and the short-term decommissioning of 
eight nuclear power plants were defined.
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Share of  heat consumption 13.2 % 14 %
Eciency and consumption
Primary energy consumption  
(compared to 2008)   
−6.5 % −20 %
  −50 %
Energy productivity 
(2008–2050)
1.1 % per year
(2008–2016)
2.1 % per year
(2008–2050)
Gross electricity consumption 
(compared to 2008)
−3.6 % −10 %
  −25 %
Primary energy demand 
buildings (compared to 2008)
−18.3 %
  −80 %
Heat demand buildings 
(compared to 2008)
−6.3 % −20 %
Power consumption transport 
(compared 2005)
4.2 % −10 %
  −40 %
* Provisional value for 2016
** A more goal-orientated, ecient, and market-based expansion of renewable energies was specified in 
coalition agreement between CDU, CSU, and SPD. Under these conditions a share of 65% of renewable 
energies is strived. Corresponding changes are made. Special tender in the field of wind and solar energy 
should contribute the 2020 climate goal. The synchronisation of renewable energies and network 
capacity is challenging.
Figure 1: Quantitative targets for energy transition and status 2016 (BMWi 2018).
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3.2 The role of research 
for consensus building
Around 2010-2011, the quantified key 
objectives of the German government’s 
energy concept were based on a broad 
consensus, but still unthinkable 10 years 
earlier, among the relevant research in-
stitutes in Germany. This fulfilled a deci-
sive prerequisite with regard to the 
knowledge base and scientific policy 
foundation, which is not yet available in 
a comparable form in other countries. 
Figure 2 compares the energy mix today 
and by the year 2050 in representative 
long-term scenarios for Germany which, 
in addition to the forced conversion to 
renewable energies, all assign a central 
role to energy eciency. The quintes-
sence of the current state of knowledge 
can be summarised as follows: 
• Firstly, absolute decoupling—mode-
rately rising GDP and roughly halved 
primary energy consumption—is con-
sidered technically possible by 2050; 
• Secondly, the share of renewable 
energies in energy consumption can 
be increased all the faster the more 
successfully the remaining energy 
consumption can be reduced through 
a massive savings strategy;
• Thirdly, an ambitious climate protec-
tion strategy by 2050 requires that the 
gradual phase-out of nuclear power by 
2022 be accompanied by an equally 
strategically planned phase-out of coal 
in the 2030s; and
• Lastly, an 80% CO2 reduction target by 
2050 is considered achievable for the 
state of the art, but full decarbonisati-
on of industry (e.g. the steel industry) 
and parts of the transport system (air, 



















Nuclear energy Coal (incl. waste and other) Oil






















Figure 2: Comparison of primary energy consumption in 2017 with representative energy 
turnaround scenarios for 2050 by energy source (in PJ/a) (Samadi, S., unpublished manu-
script, Wuppertal 2018)
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3.3 Mixed results of the 
German Energy Transition 
(“Energiewende”) 
“Revolutionary goals” (Angela Merkel) 
can inspire if they are implemented! By 
the “half-way point” (2018) of the en-
ergy revolution, however, this will only 
be the case to a limited extent. The bal-
ance of the energy transition to date is 
mixed and is summarised briefly: It is a 
successful current reversal paired with a 
loss-making trac and heat reversal. 
The implementation of the “Energy E-
ciency First” principle has been delayed, 
as has the CO2 reduction due to the late 
withdrawal of coal. By increasing the 
share of renewable electricity from less 
than 5% in the 1990s to over 40% at the 
end of 2018, the feasibility of an “elec-
tricity transition” within 20 years could 
at least be demonstrated. Like no other 
industrialised country, Germany  has de-
cided to phase out nuclear energy by 
2022 and—in parallel—starting  the 
process of phasing out coal by 2038 at 
the latest. But the announcement has 
not yet been completed. If the example 
were to set a precedent in Europe, im-
plementation would be accelerated. The 
identification of socio-economic oppor-
tunities is central to this.
3.4 Promising benefi ts of the 
energy transition 
In recent years, there has been a funda-
mental paradigm shift in science in esti-
mating the expected costs and benefits 
of climate protection and energy transi-
tion. Whereas in the past, the assess-
ment of climate protection measures 
was dominated by burden sharing. Mod-
ern analyses usually calculate consider-
able positive net eects based on innova-
tions, learning eects and cost 
reductions. Studies for the Federation of 
German Industries (BDI 2019) also 
highlight the predominant benefit of 
80% CO2 reduction for German industry 
by 2050.
Particularly relevant for the implemen-
tation of the energy transition and cli-
mate protection are the so-called sector 
targets for 2030 (see Figure 3), which 
the Federal Government adopted in the 
Climate Action Plan 2050 (BMU 2016). 
These sector targets (for the five sectors: 
energy industry, industry, buildings, 
transport, and agriculture) are to form 
the core of a Federal Climate Action Act, 
which the Federal Government intends 
to initiate in 2019. 
Field of action 1990 2014 2030 2030  
(reduction in %   
compared to 1990)(Mio. t CO2-equivalent)
Energy industry 466 358 175–183 62–61 %
Buildings 209 119 70–72 67–66 %
Transport 163 160 95–98 42–40 %
Industry 283 181 140–143 51–49 %
Agriculture 88 72 58–61 34–31 %
Subtotal 1.209 890 538–557 56–54 % 
Others 39 12 5 87 %
Total 1.248 902 543–562 56–55 %
Figure 3: Sector targets in the German Federal Government’s Climate 
Protection Plan 2050 (BMU 2016).
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A recent study concisely summarises the 
analytical paradigm shift in German sci-
entific policy advice (Öko-Institut et al. 
2018). In the study, six institutes with 
dierent orientations examined the con-
sequences of the implementation of the 
sector targets up to the year 2030 (see 
above) of the German Climate Action 
Plan 2050.
In brief, the following results 
were obtained (Öko-Institut 
et al. 2018 p. 7 .):
1. Achieving the sectoral objectives will 
require significant additional invest-
ment in all sectors. The implementa-
tion of the energy transition and am-
bitious climate protection represents 
a future investment programme with a 
new “green” quality, as it is suitable to 
raise the weak German investment 
rate and increase the resulting macro-
economic multiplier eects. New 
business fields like in the area of en-
ergy and resource eciency, sustain-
able mobility and renewable energies, 
can trigger a new ecological quality of
“green growth impulses”.
2. In most sectors, a strategy focused 
primarily on energy eciency is asso-
ciated with economic advantages, 
that is, the necessary investments and 
costs are oset by high and in some 
cases higher savings. In this respect, 
the study confirms the economic ra-
tionality of the “Energy Eciency 
First” principle.
5. The study by Öko-Institut et al. 2018 
also calculates the expected (net) em-
ployment eects from the implemen-
tation of the above-mentioned sector 
targets by 2030. In total, significantly 
higher net employment eects 
(427,000 additional employees) are 
calculated for target path A (maxi-
mum eciency) for the year 2030. 
For target path B (maximum renew-
able energies) 307,000 additional 
employees were identified.
In a word: The energy revolution could 
become a “Green New Deal made in Ger-
many”. Climate protection and ecologi-
cal modernisation, as well as competi-
tiveness and social compatibility go 
hand in hand.
3. The analysis of electricity prices and 
energy costs also shows that an en-
ergy transition is usually advanta-
geous for the economy in comparison 
to the reference development, or it 
only leads to minor burdens. 
4. Even today in northern Germany, a 
proportion of variable electricity 
feed-in of about 50% (mainly from 
wind) is safely controlled. The study 
shows how supply security can be 
guaranteed by “flexibility options” 
which are integrated into the energy 
system parallel to the increasing vari-
able electricity input from wind and 
sun. The study, therefore, states so-
berly for the period up to the year 
2030: “A threat to the security of sup-
ply in the area of electricity generation 
is not discernible or can be avoided by 
comparatively moderate measures” 
(Öko-Institut et al. 2018 p. 7).
2 The study distinguishes two target paths: Target 
path A (focus on energy e  ciency) largely 
exploits existing e  ciency potentials and takes 
renewable energies into account in the heating 
market only to a very limited extent. Target path 
B (focus on renewable energies), on the other 
hand, largely exploits the available heat potential 
of renewable energy combined with a minimum 
of energy e  ciency. 
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4. Modernising Energy – 
In the period that followed, however, 
the technical discussion focused more 
and more on highly dierentiated tech-
nical and economic analyses, especially 
regarding the transition of the electricity 
sector. This created the danger that the 
energy transition would be perceived as 
a technocratic project, that “those up 
there” would carry out more badly than 
right. What is the purpose of the pro-
ject? What good does it bring? What do 
we, as citizens, benefit from it? These 
are clear questions, but the answers are 
still not very satisfactory. It is crucial for 
the social acceptance of a “project of the 
century” (1980-2050) that the socio-po-
litical dimension of the desired transfor-
mation is communicated transparently 
and supported by a broad citizen move-
ment. The socio-political impetus pro-
vided by the German Ethics Commission 
(2011) and the emerging brilliant de-
centralisation process are, therefore, 
fundamental, conceptual and practical 
impulses for the energy transition.
4.1 Decentralisation as 
a secular trend
On 30th May 2011, the “Ethics Commis-
sion” appointed by Chancellor Merkel 
presented its final report (Ethics Com-
mission 2011). The energy transition is 
understood as a socio-political task and 
against this background, the idea of a 
joint work “Energy Future Germany” is 
put into the foreground. Above all, the 
enormous importance of the local level 
is emphasised. 
There are already numerous proofs of 
this today and future contours are dis-
cernible: traditional energy supply com-
panies will disappear; millions of new 
players on the demand and supply sides 
of the energy system will interact with 
each other; the electricity, heat and 
transport sectors will grow together 
through digitalisation and electrifica-
tion; networks will be intelligently con-
trolled; and virtual power plants, the in-
terconnection of decentralised 
generation facilities, storage, and load 
management options will play a major 
role. The progress potential of this new 
The energy transition was conceived in the 1980s as a socio-political project. The fact that this 
should be accompanied by greater decentralisation (“re-municipalisation”) and democratisation 
of the energy industry was at the core of a meaningful socio-political reform vision. 
––––––––
   Transforming the Society 
  
The residential area 
„Solarsiedlung" in 
Freiburg, Germany
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4  See the article in the Handelsblatt (Witsch 2018) 
for criticism of the existing Tenant Flow Act of 
2017.
3 The term “re-socialisation” is used here to refer 
to the “return of social rights to dispose of 
energy”—based on state-of-the-art technologies 
for energy e  ciency, renewable energies, 
energy-saving behaviour and digitisation. 
mbined with a minimum of energy e  ciency.
energy world can perhaps be subsumed 
under the term “re-socialisation”.3 The 
remaining interaction between central-
ised and decentralised systems on a re-
newable basis is still largely open. Tech-
nically possible decentralization does 
not mean democratisation per se, but it 
can pave the way for a future democra-
tised energy world—social control and 
governance as well as comprehensive 
citizen participation—and financing 
provided.
“Re-socialisation” also does not simply 
mean ownership decentralisation (e.g. 
for homeowners) based on the described 
secular technological decentralisation 
trends. Fair and secure access for all 
households (especially tenants) to af-
fordable renewable energy (electricity, 
heat) and sustainable mobility must 
rather be combined with this. A new bal-
ance must also be found with remaining 
and new central systems on a renewable 
basis, such as oshore wind farms, geo-
thermal and solar thermal power gen-
eration, electricity and hydrogen im-
ports, Power-to-X plants, large battery 
storage facilities, national and interna-
tional grid expansion, etc.
4.1.1 Prosumer: Homeowners 
benefi t - tenants still have a 
hard time
The most decentralised level of the new 
energy world is that of the “prosumer”, 
i.e., many new players who mostly pro-
duce electricity using PV, but also con-
sume electricity from the grid at the 
same time (hence, prosumer).
In 2017, there were 1.64 million PV sys-
tems in Germany (see BSW-Solar 2018). 
The majority of this uses electricity for 
their own consumption and at the same 
time feeds solar power into the grid. It is 
estimated that by 2035, about 20.3 TWh 
of electricity can be replaced from the 
grid in detached and semi-detached 
houses in conjunction with decentral-
ised storage facilities (batteries) (cf. 
PVP4Grid 2018). If tenant electricity 
models were to support this decentrali-
sation trend in the future4 , this poten-
tial could be even higher, and above all, 
enable tenants and low-income house-
holds to benefit from low-cost solar power.
4.1.2 Citizens’ energy 
cooperatives: driving force 
for energy transition
Citizens’ energy cooperatives are an im-
portant driver of energy transition and 
decentralised energy generation in Ger-
many, both from a regional economic 
point of view and in terms of accept-
ance. Their number has risen unexpect-
edly within 10 years from 8 in 2006 to 
850 in 2018. Owners are 95% private 
individuals, usually from the region. The 
focus is on electricity generation (83%). 
For this reason, citizens’ energy coopera-
tives that are anchored locally must con-





opportunities for rural areas
The use of renewable energies is becom-
ing increasingly important in rural re-
gions. As of July 2017, 153 “100% re-
newable” (“100%ee-regions”) 
municipalities and regions have the goal 
of completely shifting their energy sup-
ply to renewable energies. The 153 re-
gions comprise about 25 million inhabit-
ants and cover a total area of about 
127,000 km2. Bioenergy villages are a 
very interesting special form of sustain-
able village development. They can be 
part of the 100ee movement. Bioenergy 
villages are characterised by the fact 
that a significant part of the electricity 
and heat demand in the village is mostly 
produced in CHP (combined heat and 
power) plants, which are often owned 
by local heat consumers and farmers 
and whose biomass used does not come 
from maize monocultures or GMO crops.
4.1.4 Re-municipalisation
According to estimates by experts (cf. 
Wagner et al. 2018), about 8,000 of the 
14,000 or so concessions in the electric-
ity sector expired in Germany between 
2010 and 2016. With the expiry of the 
concession contracts, many municipali-
ties discussed whether the new award of 
the concession was a first step towards 
the (re-)municipalisation of the energy 
supply. This developed into a veritable 
wave of municipal utility start-ups. If 
only companies that are active at least in 
the electricity business and were newly 
founded are counted, then the result 
will be 152 new municipal energy sup-
ply companies, all of which were found-
ed between 2005 and 2016. 
4.1.5 Solid municipal substructure
Germany has a solid municipal base for 
decentralised transformation processes 
where 1,458 member companies were 
organised in the Association of Munici-
pal Enterprises (VKU) in 2018. Of these, 
733 are active in electricity, 646 in gas, 
and 574 in heat (VKU 2018). In 2018, 
around € 3.9 billion was invested in 
these divisions: 91,671 employees were 
employed and sales of € 81.186 billion 
were achieved. The CDEC, the European 
association of local and regional energy 
companies, is made up of around 1,500 
energy companies from 10 European 
countries—Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. Den-
mark has carried out a particularly im-
pressive process of decentralisation today. 
All these local energy transition activi-
ties have an enormous regional econom-
ic significance in addition to their driv-
ing role for the national energy 
transition. It is estimated that between 
2012 and 2030, municipal value added 
from renewable energies will increase 
from €11.1 billion to €16.3 billion. Mu-
nicipal added value is created through 
municipal tax revenues, corporate prof-
its, rental income, avoidance of regional 
outflow of purchasing power through 
energy cost savings and employment ef-
fects (cf. Hirschl et al. 2010).
It is also very remarkable that up to 
2012 (more recent figures are not avail-
able), about 46% of the investments in 
renewable energies in Germany were 
made by private households and farmers 
and only initially about 5% by the four 
large electricity companies. Although 
this proportion has now shifted more in 
favour of the electricity companies, like 
investments in oshore wind farms, it is 
nevertheless clear that the ownership 
structure of the electricity supply 
through renewable energies has devel-
oped strongly in the direction of citizen 
financing.
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4.1.6 Perspectives for European 
energy citizens
 What is interesting is the overall poten-
tial for the EU28, which could be tapped 
in the long term through modern decen-
tralisation options based on renewable 
energies and operated by “citizens”. This 
decentralisation potential for “energy 
citizens” has been identified in a study 
by the University of Delft for the year 
2050 (Kampman et al. 2016). All indi-
viduals or households, public enterpris-
es, and small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs)—that individually or 
jointly generate decentralised renewable 
electricity or can participate in local 
flexibilisation and demand-side manage-
ment activities through the controllable 
use of batteries, e-mobility or electric 
boilers/heat pumps—were grouped to-
gether as “energy citizens”. The figures 
are striking and point to a conceivable 
revolutionary process of technical de-
centralisation, and thus, of re-socialisa-
tion in Europe. Total EU28 decentralised 
electricity generation from wind power 
is estimated at more than 900 TWh by 
2050 and from PV at more than 600 
TWh. The main producing countries of 
these energy citizens are Germany and 
France, followed by the UK, Spain, Italy, 
Sweden and Poland. This electricity gen-
eration by “energy citizens” would take 
place in more than 150 million solar 
plants and over 10,000 wind power 
plants.
Of course, today’s reality in the EU28 is 
still far from this scenario projection for 
the year 2050. At the same time, the sce-
nario analysis illustrates the technically 
possible potential for deconcentrating 
and decentralisation on the European 
electricity markets if the economic and 
social conditions were also created for 
this.
From Energy Consumer to Participant – The Potential for 2050
Power production and services by energy citizens* per member state
potential, million citizens
* collectives, households, micro and small enterprises, 
   public entites



















































For comparison: EU citizen energy 
may reach 1.558 TWh in 2050; 
EU nuclear power production was 
840 TWh in 2016.
Figure 4: From Energy Consumer to Participant - The Potential for 2050 
(Heinrich Böll Foundation and others 2018)
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4.2 The “Coal Commission”: 
Lessons for Europe
In view of these perspectives, it is under-
standable that more and more people 
are raving about “Small is beautiful”. 
Even a global corporation like Siemens 
propagates in its marketing activities: 
“The future of energy supply is local and 
decentralised” (cf. ZfK 8/2018). And un-
doubtedly, the trend towards decentrali-
sation is a technological megatrend driv-
en by brilliant cost reductions, not only 
in the energy transition in Germany and 
Europe but also worldwide (cf. National-
grid 2016). 
However, this trend is embedded in and 
driven or slowed down by existing struc-
tures, processes and the vision of a so-
cio-ecological transformation. It is one 
of the greatest challenges for transfor-
mation to free oneself from the status 
quo and past fossil-nuclear path depend-
encies and to pursue a completely new 
vision. This can be easily calculated in 
scenarios and well hidden in the harm-
less-sounding term “structural change”. 
However, the hardest test is whether an 
energy transition can be successfully im-
plemented. For Germany and other Eu-
ropean coal countries, for example, a so-
cially responsible coal phase-out—in 
addition to the nuclear phase-out—is at 
the heart of the transition of the electric-
ity sector. In terms of mandate, format, 
composition and outcome, the German 
“Coal Commission” is not only evidence 
of the need for a new type of governance 
but has also compiled numerous indica-
tions and recommendations for its re-
gional implementation. 
On 26 January 2019, the Commission 
“Growth, Structural Change and Em-
Lignite mining
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transformation can be derived from the 
present recommendations of the Com-
mission, which could have a signal eect 
not just in Europe, but also globally. The 
share of coal-fired power generation 
(2017) in electricity consumption is 
40% in Germany, 45% in Romania, 46% 
in Greece, 54% in the Czech Republic, 
and 81% in Poland. Moreover, it is even 
higher in some cases. If Europe is to be 
decarbonised in the long term, further 
“coal commissions” are needed in some 
member states that can provide an impe-
tus for the national transformation pro-
cess that is currently underway. Europe-
wide industrial policy learning eects of 
the German “Coal Commission” are an 
example:
1. The Commission has compiled around 
200 pages of project proposals for 
structural development for the Saar-
land and four other regions con-
cerned (Lusatian, Helmstedter, Cen-
tral German and Rhine districts); and 
157 measures and projects for the 
Rhineland alone, including 123 
“emergency measures” (from 2021). 
Such an extensive stocktaking and 
collection of ideas for (regional) struc-
tural change has not yet taken place.
2. The concrete involvement of 60,000 
employees (20,000 of whom are di-
rectly employed in lignite mining) 
and 45,000 people, who have already 
been resettled or may have been re-
settled by thousands more on the oth-
er, is recognised by all members of the 
commission as a clear commitment to 
socially acceptable transformation. In 
addition, there are 5,700 employees 
in hard coal-fired power plants 
throughout Germany.
3. This also recognises the structural 
change accelerated by climate protec-
tion and energy transition, and explic-
itly calls for the resulting responsibil-
ity of society as a whole: “Terminating 
coal-fired power generation [...] is a 
task for society as a whole, since the 
foundations for this decision are 
based on ecological and economic 
considerations for society as a whole” 
(Commission on Growth, Structural 
Change and Employment, 2019, p. 
111).
4. Summarising a large number of Com-
mission proposals, the contours of a 
new (regionalised) socio-ecological 
industrial and service policy can be 
seen. New governance of socio-ecologi-
cal transformation is emerging both in 
the necessary cooperation of all politi-
cal levels (federal government, states, 
regions, municipalities), through the 
participation of stakeholders (politics, 
business, trade unions, NGOs) and 
through institutional innovations for 
steering and coordinating processes. 
ployment” (in short: “Coal Commis-
sion”) appointed by the German Federal 
Government presented its eagerly await-
ed final report. Understandably, public 
attention focused initially on the ques-
tion of whether the pluralistically com-
posed commission (a total of 31 mem-
bers) could reach a consensus on a date 
for the complete phase-out of lignite and 
hard coal-based electricity generation. 
After nine meetings within half a year, 
the Commission finally recommended 
“the end of 2038” as the closing date for 
coal-fired power generation. This is ear-
lier than planned by the corporations 
and if optimistic assumptions are made, 
it will be compatible with the achieve-
ment of the government’s ocial CO2 
reduction target in the energy industry 
(reduction of CO2 emissions by about 
60% by 2030 compared with 1990, i.e. 
to 175 to 193 million tonnes), but the 
German level of ambition is clearly too 
low for sucient global climate protec-
tion. 
Despite this relativisation of the date of 
exit, it remains to be seen that if the 
Commission’s recommendation is incor-
porated into binding legislation (a treaty 
that extends beyond legislative periods) 
and implemented, then Germany could 
be the first large industrialised country 
in the world to implement an orderly 
phase-out of both nuclear energy and 
coal-fired power generation. Around 
50% of the secured power plant capacity 
available today will then be taken o the 
grid in just under 20 years. Indirectly, 
this ambitious double exit strategy 
means doing everything possible to en-
sure that the ocial expansion target of 
65% renewable electricity generation by 
2030 is achieved, and then be ambi-
tiously continued up to 100%. 
New concepts, institutional innovations, 
exemplary measures and projects for the 
implementation of a socio-ecological 
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5. Stocktaking of 
and climate policy
         European energy 
5.1 Status quo of the EU 
energy system
Power generation
In 2016, the EU produced 46% of its 
own energy needs, while 54% had to be 
imported from countries outside the EU 
(see here and below European Commis-
sion 2018; Eurostat 2018). It is a fact to-
day and will remain under “business as 
usual” policies in the future that, firstly, 
the EU is enormously dependent on im-
ports of oil and natural gas.
The Member States’ own energy produc-
tion is as varied as the energy mix: with 
29% of EU energy production (nuclear 
energy is the main energy source), fol-
lowed by 28% of renewable energies, 
17% of solid fuels, 14% of gas (14%), 












Figure 5: Share of EU energy production by energy source (2016) 
(Eurostat 2018)
The second fact is that almost a third of 
Europe’s own energy production is still 
based on nuclear energy. Imagine a situ-
ation in which import problems for oil 
and natural gas coincide with an acci-
dental (partial) failure of nuclear power 
production in Europe. Obviously, this 
would be a continental nuclear catastro-
phe of unimaginable proportions, so 
that even for reasons of security of supply,
the acceleration of the European energy 
system cannot be postponed. 
Structure of energy consumption
33% of the European Union’s final en-
ergy is consumed by the transport sec-
tor, followed by households (26%), in-
dustry (25%), services (14%) and 
agriculture and forestry (2%). The e-
ciency of an internal combustion engine 
is around 20%, that of an electric motor 
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Figure 6: Development of gross electricity generation 1990-2016 in the EU-28 
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over 90% - and the recovery of braking 
energy can also be considered. This 
makes it clear that the final energy share 
of transport can be reduced consider-
ably—simply by switching to e-mobility.
In 2016, around 22% of the final energy 
consisted of electricity from various 
sources, 44% of the electricity was gen-
erated from fossil fuels, 30% from re-
newable energies, and 26% from nucle-
ar energy. Decarbonisation scenarios in 
most countries assume that the share of 
electricity from renewable energies will 
have to increase drastically in order to 
decarbonise the transport sector (e.g. 
through e-mobility) and the building 
sector (e.g. through electric heat 
pumps).
CO2 emissions
In 2015, CO2 emissions were 22% lower 
than in the base year 1990 and the EU is 
likely not only to meet but even to ex-
ceed its 2020 target (20% GHG reduc-
tion). The absolute decoupling process 
between rising EU GDP and falling CO2 
emissions is also encouraging but is not 
yet enough to achieve the 40% CO2 re-
duction target for 2030.
Energy e  ciency
Energy eciency is measured by the val-
ue of energy intensity, which indicates 
how much energy is needed to produce 
a unit of gross domestic product. There 
are enormous dierences between the 
EU Member States. The EU Member 
States with the highest energy intensity 
are Bulgaria and Estonia, while Den-
mark and Ireland have the lowest energy 
intensity. The classification of these data 
shall consider the national economic 
structure of each Member State. Service-
oriented economies have a lower energy 
intensity than economies with a high in-
dustrial share. The consideration of the 
structural change to less energy-inten-
sive industries together with the specific 
increase of the energy eciency of ap-
pliances, processes, vehicles and build-
ings together result in the energy inten-
sity eects.
Renewables
The share of renewable energies in pri-
mary energy consumption in the Union 
rose continuously between 2004 and 
2016 (from 8.5% to 17%) and is thus 
approaching the EU’s common target for 
2020 of covering 20% of its energy con-
sumption with renewable energies (cf. 
Eurostat 2018).
The highest share of renewable energies 
is used in Sweden (53.8%). It was fol-
lowed by Finland (38.7%) and Latvia 
(37.2%). At the other end of the scale 
are Luxembourg (5.4%), Belgium 
(8.7%), Malta (6%) and the Netherlands 
(6%). Moreover, 18 member states have 
not yet achieved the expansion targets 
by 2020.
The graph below shows the share of re-
newable electricity, which on average in 
the EU - based on wind and sun - has 
outstripped the share of green electricity 
generation in all other energy sources. 
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5.2 Trends in power generation: 
Renewables and coal phasing out
If one compares the development to date 
and the status of renewable electricity 
generation (2018) with the EU Commis-
sion’s expansion targets up to 2030, it 
becomes clear that a 57% share of re-
newable electricity in the EU is quite re-
alistic, even if the trend continues (see 
Figure 7). 
There are plans to phase out the capaci-
ties of European hard coal-fired power 
plants at ¾ by 2030, with the exception 
of Germany (2038), and above all, Po-
land. According to current plans (as of 
the end of 2018), the share of coal-fired 
power generation in Poland is to be re-
duced from the current 77% to only 60% 
by 2030. It is obvious that European 
support is needed for a faster exit. This 
also applies to other European countries 
(Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Greece and Slovenia), which have “ex-
cellent potential for wind and solar en-
ergy” (ibid., p. 24). In 2018, the EU 
Commission presented its platform for 
“Coal Regions in Transition” in two 
workshops: “Currently, 41 regions in 12 
EU Member States depend significantly 
on revenues from coal mines and coal-
fired power generation, which provide 
direct jobs for about 185,000 employ-
ees” (translation by the authors, (ibid., 
p. 25). In a concerted action between 
Germany and these countries, the rec-
ommendations of the German “Coal 
Commission” (see above) and the expe-
rience available in these countries can 
be evaluated for a “Just Transition” 
strategy and translated into national 
coal phase-out plans.  
5.3 Is the market accelerating 
the exit from coal?
The increase in operating costs for coal 
and gas-fired power plants in 2017-2018 
is of economic relevance: “Between 
2017 and 2018 the price of coal rose by 














































































cates by 170%” (translation by the au-
thors, ibid., p. 31). If this increase con-
tinues, there will be a greater incentive 
to phase out fossil-based electricity sup-
ply earlier than previously planned. 
“Apart from the specific situation in Po-
land, the political headline of the EU cli-
mate and energy legislation for 2030 is 
to accelerate the withdrawal from coal 
in Europe” (translation of the authors, 
ibid., p. 39). It is also consistent with 
this that the short-term forecast present-
ed by the IEA (see IEA, Renewables. 
Analysis and Forecast to 2023, Paris 
2018) in 2018 and revised upwards, that 
the total renewable electricity genera-
tion capacity will increase from 566.9 
GW (2017) to 754.4 GW by 2023, is sub-
mitted in 2018. The largest increase was 
in Germany with around 47 GW, fol-
lowed by France with 28 GW and the UK 
with 13 GW. 
In addition to the brilliant cost reduction 
of PV and wind, the profitability of coal-
fired power is determined by the stricter 
regulation of air pollution and the pric-
ing of carbon. According to Carbon 
Tracker (2018), 42% of current coal-
fired power plants are already unprofit-
able today (2018) and 72% in 2040. For 
Europe as a whole, it is calculated that 
by 2018 long-term operating costs for 
20% of coal-fired power plants under 
construction or in operation will be 
higher than the electricity costs from re-
newable energies; in 2030 this would 
apply 100% to all European power 
plants. This means that for economic 
reasons, the entire European coal-fired 
power plant park would have to be shut 
down by 2030. 
The relevance of this analysis for the 
phase-out of coal in Europe is obvious. 
Although the figures are based on many 
assumptions and require further dier-
entiation, a trend seems to be emerging: 
All European countries and all compa-
nies with a high share of coal-fired elec-
tricity generation should prepare a much 
more strategic exit from coal and ex-
plore new business opportunities before 
the cost ratios on the electricity markets 
enforce this. 
Figure 7: Share of renewable electricity generation up to 2030 according to 
the long-term strategy of the EU Commission (Agora/Sandberg 2019)
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      for European energy 
The rights of Member States regarding 
the exploitation of their energy resourc-
es, the choice between dierent energy 
sources, and the general structure of the 
energy supply (energy mix) must not be 
aected. However, the objective in Art. 
194 “Promotion of energy eciency and 
energy savings” has an indirect influence 
on the overall energy supply and its 
composition, and the objective “Devel-
opment of renewable energy sources” 
has a direct influence on it. Therefore, 
the EU has two considerable levers to 
influence the energy mix of the Member 
States, provided there is a political ma-
jority.
The main goal is to convince the public 
of the socio-ecological benefits of the en-
ergy transition to analyse what needs to 
be done for ecological reasons, what is 
already feasible today and what may re-
quire further development of the legal 
framework.
6.1 New programme - 
more challenging goals
In 2015, Commission President Jean-
Claude Juncker presented the idea of an 
Energy Union as one of ten priorities on 
his political agenda. The Energy Union 
comprises five interlinked political fields 
of action: Security, solidarity and trust; 
integration of the internal energy mar-
ket; energy eciency; climate protection 
(decarbonisation); and research, inno-
vation and competitiveness.
Above all, the “Clean Energy for All Eu-
ropeans” package published in 2016 
aims to advance climate protection and 
to implement more ambitious 2030 tar-
gets (see below). The increase in the im-
portance of the energy eciency target 
should also be emphasised.
6.2 E  ciency fi rst
The current energy eciency framework 
consists of several directives which are 
constantly being revised. In addition to 
the Energy Eciency Directive (EED), 
the Eco-design Directive (2009/125/
EEC), the Energy Labelling Directive 
(2010/30/EU) and the Energy Perfor-
mance of Buildings Directive (2010/31/
EU) exist.
In 2014, however, it was already fore-
seeable that the EU would not be able to 
achieve its eciency target (20%) by 
2020 with the measures taken at that 
time. It is estimated that the actual sav-
ings in primary energy by 2020 will be 
only 17.6%. With its “Clean Energy for 
all Europeans” package, the EU Commis-
sion therefore formulated “Eciency 
first” as the central principle for the first 
time. 
However, the discussion continues on 
what “first” should mean in practice. Is 
the current strong prioritisation of the 
expansion of renewable energies in the 
EU or especially in Germany to be 
changed? Hardly in practice. In theory, 
this is more likely, based on the annual 
World Energy Scenarios of the Interna-
The EU institutions are empowered to act in those areas where the EU treaties explicitly allow it. 
The current legal framework is based on the Treaty of Lisbon (w.e.f. 01.12.2009). Article 194 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the legal basis for the common energy 
policy, states that the EU is responsible for the functioning of energy markets, security of supply, 
promotion of energy e  ciency, renewable energies and development of energy networks. 
––––––––
6. Legal framework 
   and climate policy
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tional Energy Agency (IEA) in Paris. For 
the IEA, too, is increasingly advocating 
the “Energy Eciency First” principle—
a veritable paradigm shift for an institu-
tion that for decades served as the most 
important key witness for the expansion 
of fossil and nuclear power generation. 
The more decisively the cost-eective 
eciency potential is realised, the faster 
the share of renewable energies in (re-
sidual) energy consumption increases, 
the more energy (import) costs can be 
saved, the more positive (net) employ-
ment eects are possible and the fewer 
acceptance and environmental problems 
arise as a result of the necessary expan-
sion of the renewable energy supply and 
networks (cf. Hennicke and Welfens 
2012).
6.3 No more Nuclear First!
The Euratom Treaty of 25 March 1957 
still represents a powerful anachronism 
of EU energy policy. It states as a valid 
EU objective to this day: “The task of the 
Atomic Energy Community is to contrib-
ute to raising the standard of living in 
the Member States and to develop rela-
tions with other countries by creating 
the conditions necessary for the rapid 
formation and development of nuclear 
industries” (cf. EU 2016). None of these 
tasks is still accepted today by a majority 
of European countries because reality 
has long since refuted the aforemen-
tioned requirement of “rapid [...] devel-
opment of nuclear industries”. And even 
in countries with nuclear energy doubts 
are growing as to whether nuclear in-
dustries actually “contribute to raising 
the standard of living” in comparison to 
risk-minimised alternatives. The parlia-
mentary group of Bündnis 90/DIE 
GRÜNEN has, therefore, called on the 
Federal Government (Bundestag 2018) 
to finally take the coalition agreement 
seriously and to support Euratom re-
form. 
Therefore, this should mean, among 
other things:
• To abolish the special status of nuclear 
power established by the Treaty;
• No extension of the term beyond 40 
years may be granted; and
• To enforce an increase and standardi-
sation of liability requirements.
That would be a first important step. But 
until the “Nuclear First” principle hoped 
for by the lobby 60 years ago can be 
changed into a contractually agreed 
“exit” principle, there is still a long way to 
go. The nuclear industry is by no means 
beaten and is still considered indispen-
sable by the EU Commission. Both know 
that new nuclear power plants are no 
longer competitive with renewables and 
energy eciency. Therefore, the nuclear 
industry is now openly demanding state 
subsidies. It refers to its alleged contri-
bution to climate protection and refers 
to “representing nearly 800 European 
companies” and “supporting about 
800,000 jobs” in Europe (cf. FORATOM, 
Sustainable Finance: Encouraging in-
vestment in low-carbon technologies, 
Position Paper, February 2019). 
With this position paper, FORATOM 
complains to the EU Commission that 
nuclear power as a “low carbon” tech-
nology receives too little support com-
pared to renewables. In concrete terms, 
one of their demands is: “Encourage the 
market introduction of flexible and con-
trollable ‘low-carbon’ technology, like 
nuclear energy, as a back-up system for 
variable renewables [...]” (ibid., transla-
tion of the authors). In plain language: 
The nuclear industry demands subsidies 
for a field of application for which it is 
the least suitable technology - for flexibi-
lisation and for uninterrupted power 
generation in unstable power grids! 
But it gets even more dubious. A central 
strategy paper of the EU Commission 
(cf. European Commission, 2018a) for-
mulates for the year 2050 with clear ref-
erence to more than 80% share of renew-
able power generation: “Together with a 
nuclear power share of approximately 
15%, this will be the backbone of a car-
bon-free European power system” (ibid. 
p. 9). The position paper of FORATOM 
uses this unnecessary kowtow (approx. 
15% nuclear power in 2050) of the EU 
Commission in front of the nuclear lobby 
to falsify the position, which almost 
claims the opposite: “In its ‘Clean Planet 
for all’ communication, the European 
Commission confirmed that nuclear 
power will form the backbone […] of a 
carbon-free European power system, to-
gether with renewables” (ibid. p. 1). 
Suddenly atomic energy becomes “the 
backbone” and renewables change into a 
secondary role! But PR tricks make nu-
clear energy neither more risk-free nor 
more economical: Compared to renew-
able power generation (including back-
up systems), new nuclear power plants, 
in addition to their unacceptable risks, 
have no economic chance. A nuclear 
share of 15% in 2050 is inconceivable 
without new construction. However, 
there is a lack of acceptance and willing-
ness to finance on the part of banks as 
well as a lack of investment interest on 
the part of economically thinking com-
panies. It is time for the Commission to 
draw these facts to the attention of the 
nuclear lobby and concentrate all its ef-
forts on promoting risk-minimising al-
ternatives, eciency and renewable en-
ergies. The termination of the Euratom 
Treaty is a necessary first step in this di-
rection.
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6.4 Energy Union and “Winter 
Package”
The Winter Package presented by the Eu-
ropean Commission in November 2016 
set the course for European energy poli-
cy in the coming decade. The ‘Winter 
Package’ can pave the way for a Europe-
anisation of the energy transition even if 
the Commission has not yet used the 
term ‘energy transition’ and the quanti-
fied objectives of the winter package are 
formulated in a much more cautious and 
nuclear-friendly way than in the German 
Energy Concept 2010/2011 (BMWi and 
BMU 2010).
The winter package comprises eight le-
gal acts which were at dierent stages of 
the legislative process at the end of 
2018. These will be briefly presented be-
low:
• Amendment of the Directive on the 
Energy Performance of Buildings 
(2018/844): Following the winter 
package amendment, Member States 
must now develop long-term renovati-
on strategies with a view to 2050. 
• Amendment of the Renewable 
Energies Directive (2018/2001):
The amended Directive now includes 
the binding EU target of a share of 
renewable energies of at least 32% 
of fi nal energy consumption in 2030. 
However, this EU target, unlike the 
2020 targets, has not been broken 
down to binding national targets. 
• Amendment of the Energy E  ci-
ency Directive (2018/2002): The 
amendment was adopted by the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the Council at 
the end of 2018. It sets an indicative 
energy e  ciency target for the year 
2030 at 32.5%, with this target being 
reviewed in 2023 and revised upwards 
if necessary. The mandatory savings 
rate of 0.8% of annual fi nal energy 
consumption for all Member States 
has been retained. 
• Governance Regulation 
(2018/1999): The Regulation was 
adopted by the European Parliament 
and the Council at the end of 2018. It 
requires all Member States to develop 
and submit to the European Commis-
sion integrated energy and climate 
change plans (INEK plans) and long-
term strategies. It also introduces 
reporting obligations and a di erenti-
ated monitoring process. The Gover-
nance Regulation is an essential step 
towards more e ective and transpa-
rent coordination and governance of a 
multi-level policy system such as that 
of the EU. 
• Amendment of the Electricity 
Market Ordinance: This has not yet 
been adopted by Parliament and the 
Council (as of January 2019). The 
amendment addresses the issue of 
capacity mechanisms or markets and 
sets requirements for the allocation of 
limited transmission capacity between 
the electricity grids of two or more 
Member States.
• Amendment of the Electricity Mar-
ket Directive: The Directive is inten-
ded to strengthen the rights of energy 
consumers. This is to be achieved 
through greater use of smart meters, 
variable tari s and price comparison 
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portals. Member States should also 
create the regulatory conditions for 
the establishment of Energy Commu-
nities. Consumers can join forces in 
these as prosumers and jointly gene-
rate energy for their own consumption 
or for feeding into a grid.
• Risk Preparedness Directive: This 
directive is intended to oblige Member 
States to take appropriate measures to 
increase the resilience of the electrici-
ty supply system. 
• Amendment of the ACER Directive: 
This amendment is intended to give 
the Agency for the Cooperation of Ener-
gy Regulators (ACER) additional and 
stronger powers. 
During COP 24 in November 2018, 
Miguel Arias Cañete, the EU Commis-
sioner for Climate Change and Energy, 
presented a long-term strategy for a cli-
mate-neutral economy by 2050. The 
roadmap presented includes the follow-
ing points:
• By 2050, the EU should reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80% 
compared to 1990 levels; through 
domestic emission reductions alone
• The milestones are a 40% reduction 
by 2030 and a 60% reduction by 2040.
• All sectors must contribute to their 
technological and economic potential 
(European Commission 2018b)
Despite the non-binding nature of this 
long-term proposal, it is nevertheless re-
markable that the EU Commission - in 
direct contradiction to the US climate 
policy under Trump - is introducing such 
a long-term strategy for all member 
states into the debate, thus returning to 
its earlier intentions of assuming a glob-
al pioneering role.
The Commission formulates the long-
term strategy as a strategy for a “pros-
perous, modern, competitive and cli-
mate-neutral economy” (European 
Commission 2018c). The reasons are 
given in the summarised result from 
eight scenarios. Macroeconomic corner-
stones are included:
• Halving total EU energy consumption 
by 2050;
• Increasing the current energy-relevant 
investment rate (in terms of GNP) 
from the current 2% to 2.8%; this 
means additional investment per year 
between € 175 to 290 billion by 2050;
• Reduction of the current energy 
import calculation of € 266 billion 
by 70% by 2050. Cumulated over the 
entire period up to 2050, a sum of 2-3 
trillion euros from energy cost savings 
could, therefore, be invested in ecolo-
gical modernisation;
• Reduction of the current half a million 
premature deaths from fossil air pollu-
tion by 40% and from disease damage 
costs by around €200 billion per year; 
and
• In addition, the Commission expects 
to create 900,000 additional jobs.
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6.5 All member countries can 
benefi t
These pan-European advantages of an 
“energy transition” must be broken 
down to the individual Member States. 
Approaches to this are available, for ex-
ample with regard to quantifying possi-
ble workplace eects: A 100% Renew-
able Scenario for the EU28, like 
Germany, calculates 1.56 million addi-
tional jobs, followed by Italy (907,000), 
France (682,000), UK (372,000) and 
Belgium (367,000) (Heinrich Böll Foun-
dation et al. 2018). The following pic-
ture gives an overview:
2050 Energy Mix
A scenario showing the share of renewables by type after 
transition to 100 percent renewables and improved energy 
eciency, ten EU countries with most to gain, projections
solar thermal (including residence, 
commercial and government rooftops)
solar plants (including concentrated solar)
onshore wind
oshore wind
others (including wave, geothermal, 




























Figure 8: Energy mix 2050 (Heinrich Böll Foundation et al. 2018) 
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The COMBI project (Thema et al. 2018), 
which for the first time examines the 
multiple benefits of increasing energy 
eciency for all European Member 
States in a dierentiated way, was an 
important step in the direction of an 
even more comprehensive “quantifica-
tion of country-specific benefits and co-
benefits” through ambitious energy e-
ciency policy. It was assumed that in 
comparison to a reference path with a 
reduction in energy consumption of 27% 
by 2030, a more ambitious reduction in 
energy consumption of 33% would be 
achieved. The eects were quantified 
and, as far as possible, also monetarised: 
- reduced emissions to health Ecosys-
tems and Crops;
- the saving of biotic/abiotic resources 
such as metals and non-metals;
- on social welfare such as disposable 
income and health;
- macroeconomics (labour market, 
public budgets, GNP); and
- the energy system (networks, energy 
supply, security of supply)
For the EU28, about 2.3 million addi-
tional years of employment were calcu-
lated.
At the latest since the establishment of 
the “Coal Commission” (see above), at-
tention has also increased for possible 
negative consequences of structural 
change. The mass protests in France 
(“Yellow West”) triggered by the gaso-
line price increases have so far been the 
clearest signal that an energy transition 
and climate protection can only succeed 
in the sense of a “Just Transition”.
The instruments of energy transition 
and climate protection policy must not 
deepen the already existing social divide 
in society any further. This requires 
much more than the consideration of a 
“social component”: What is needed is a 
more balanced management and selec-
tion of instruments for the energy transi-
tion than it has been customary so far in 
terms of social policy.
6.6 Fighting energy poverty
Energy poverty, the inadequate supply 
of heat, cooling and electricity, is a 
growing problem in the EU. This is also 
documented more precisely by the EU 
Commission (European Commission 
2018c). The Commission estimates that 
more than 50 million households in Eu-
rope are aected by energy poverty (see 
European Commission 2018d). The win-
ter package of the EU Commission, 
therefore, also places a stronger focus on 
consumers and social aspects of energy 
transition. Member States are to be sup-
ported in reducing the energy costs of 
consumers by investing in energy e-
ciency. Integrated energy and climate 
plans should also explicitly include 
Member States’ measures against energy 
poverty.
In Germany, for example, energy pov-
erty is growing and will, unless counter-
measures are taken, aggravate the al-
ready dicult social situation of poor 
households. It is completely unaccepta-
ble that in 2017, according to the Fed-
eral Network Agency, approximately 
330,000 electricity and 40,000 gas 
blocks were imposed because house-
holds were unable to pay their bills. “De-
pending on the definition and calcula-
tion method, between 8% and 25% of 
consumers in Germany fall into the cat-
egory of energy poverty” (ibid. p. 4). In 
this respect, the EU must increase the 
pressure on all Member States not only 
to collect data but above all, to imple-
ment targeted programmes and meas-
ures to reduce energy poverty.
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     strategies for a 
7.1 Core elements of an energy 
(e  ciency) policy (“Policy Mix”)
The litmus test for successful energy (ef-
ficiency) policy is still pending. In no 
other country in the world has it been 
proven to date that what is necessary for 
climate protection reasons and what can 
be achieved in terms of technical and eco-
nomic savings can also be achieved in real-
ity. With the directives mentioned 
above, European energy eciency poli-
cy, more than Germany, has initiated 
ground-breaking decisions, but there are 
still considerable gaps between the cal-
culated scenario targets and reality. 
Energy eciency policy needs to be up-
graded significantly both institutionally 
and in terms of human resources and 
natural resources. Eectiveness must be 
increased by a stronger focus on stand-
ards and bids for the production side. The 
Eco-Design Directive points in the right 
direction here (cf. also the fundamen-
tally positive assessment by the VDMA 
(VDMA 2015). This is because reliable 
and ambitious standard-setting an-
nounced in the long term has a wide-
spread eect, is comparatively price-
worthy, stimulates innovation and does 
not impair the competitiveness of for-
ward-looking companies if it applies 
equally to all competitors, at least in the 
large EU internal market.    
7.2 A quantitative plea for a 
“New Energy E  ciency Policy”.
Everybody’s talking about Energy E-
ciency First. but nobody knows what it 
really is! You could put it that way. Here, 
the thesis is put forward the extremely 
challenging dimension of what an en-
ergy eciency strategy means since cli-
mate and resource protection has not 
been translated into adequate govern-
ance of energy eciency policy, neither 
The implementation of a European energy transition is a complex and protracted process which 
must be carried out in the Member States within the framework of the EU targets and directives 
through a national mix of instruments with the active participation of stakeholders at regional 
and local level. In this respect, it is a matter of establishing a new “polycentric governance”, which 
also means a new understanding of the principle of subsidiarity in energy policy. The following is 
a concise overview of core strategies and instruments, in particular for implementing the “Energy 
E  ciency First” principle, which is central to energy transition.
––––––––
7. Transformation 
European  energy transition
in quantitative terms nor in quantitative 
terms. Halving the energy market, one 
of the most important submarkets of 
highly industrialised countries, in Ger-
many and throughout Europe by 2050, 
is an even greater challenge than replacing 
fossil and nuclear power generation with 
electricity from renewable sources! The 
usual economic policy credo is “markets 
grow”, but socially and economically ac-
ceptable shrinking back as an energy 
policy imperative is an absolutely new 
territory, also with regard to control and 
coordination. To date, there has been 
neither historical experience nor an ad-
equate policy mix to achieve this goal. It 
is, therefore, urgent to conduct a broad 
social dialogue on this issue. Even con-
vinced market propagandists can hardly 
claim that the “free” energy market 
could halve itself by 2050 without a 
clear and new political framework. 
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techniques in all sectors (e.g. for energy-
ecient buildings, vehicles, processes, 
devices, etc.).
Furthermore, the attempt to quantify 
the energy eciency of new social 
trends under dierent socio-economic 
conditions and political interventions is 
interesting and innovative.
The study distinguishes four clusters 
of new social trends:
a. digitalisation (for products and   
 processes);
b. new social and economic models  
 (e.g. sharing economy, social 
 disparities/energy poverty, more  
 financing of green options);
c. industrial transformation (e.g. rein- 
 dustrialisation, circular economy,  
 industrial decarbonisation); and
d. quality of life (e.g. health eects,  
 regionalisation, urbanisation).
These new social trends can have very 
dierent eects on energy consumption 
and climate protection, depending on 
how politics, business and civil society 
deal with them! In summary, this means 
unchecked growth, lifestyle and re-
bound eects that can destroy a large 
part of the technically achievable energy 
saving potential (“new trends/ine-
cient”). But the opposite may also be the 
case. With favourable framework condi-
tions (e.g. enabling and incentives for a 
behavioural change), new social trends 
can contribute to an almost revolution-
ary additional energy consumption re-
duction of 67% (“new trends/ecient”). 
Rarely has the need for forward-looking 
energy eciency and suciency policy 
been so impressively demonstrated as by 
this quantitative assessment. You can 
put it more pointedly: The real design 
and target-oriented implementation of 
the “Energy Eciency First” principle is 
decisive for whether an energy transi-
tion and adequate climate protection 
can be achieved in Europe and else-
where.












Figure 9: Saving of EU fi nal energy in 2050 with di erent energy saving strategies in com-
parison to the reference case of the EU Commission (cf. Fraunhofer ISI 2019)
The quantitative dimension of the “En-
ergy Eciency First” principle for the 
development of European energy con-
sumption and for successful climate poli-
cy has been impressively illustrated by a 
recent study (cf. Fraunhofer ISI 2019). 
An ocial projection of the currently 
probable future energy consumption in 
2050 (“reference case”) of the EU Com-
mission (cf. European Commission 
2016) was compared with three alterna-
tive development paths:
a. Removal of Market Barriers 
 (“Dismantling”)
b. New Trends (Ecient) 
 (“Trends +”)
c. New Trends (Inecient) 
 (“Trends -”)
The striking result of this comparison is 
compared strikingly in the following fig-
ure 9: The scenario “reduction” shows 
that - similar to Germany - also in the EU 
compared to a reference development by 
tapping currently known energy saving 
potentials, a total of about 50% final en-
ergy can be saved by 2050. In this me-
thodically usual overall eciency analy-
sis, the researchers consider in detail the 
already known technical-economic en-
ergy saving potentials through eciency 
Zero waste store
28 Wuppertal Spezial 54
7.3 Core strategies for an 
energy saving policy
From a large number of studies, pro-
grammes, measures and instruments for 
the implementation of an energy transi-
tion policy, the following chapter selects 
the section relating to energy saving pol-
icy. The focus is on core strategies that 
have so far received too little attention 
but should become an indispensable 
component of a new energy policy mix 
and the governance of energy saving 
policy.
Bids for the production side 
to establish eco-routines 
Large social behavioural shifts have 
many causes and drivers. Encouraging 
them through price incentives, informa-
tion, communication strategies and ex-
emplary individual behavioural changes
(“pioneers”) among consumers is not 
sucient to change structures (cf. 
Kopatz 2018). This applies overall to the 
electricity, building and transport sec-
tors, whose supply-driven infrastruc-
tures cannot be changed in a targeted 
manner, even by the most exemplary 
consumer behaviour. What is necessary, 
are more eective and often also more 
cost-eective requirements (bans and 
orders, minimum standards, limit val-
ues, regulation) on the production 
side—even if they are initially heavily 
attacked by the industries concerned. 
The new EU requirements for CO2 limits 
for passenger cars are an example of 
how the entire European car industry, 
with a long announcement and conver-
sion periods, is prompted by fleet con-
sumption standards to produce a more 
climate-friendly car fleet. Intelligently 
set and long-term announced standards 
are an incentive for innovation and cre-
ate reliable investment corridors.
Binding inclusion of energy 
suppliers in savings policy
As long as the energy suppliers hinder 
energy saving directly (e.g. through ad-
vertising, tari incentives), and do not 
actively promote it themselves, the nec-
essary implementation intensity and 
speed for achieving the energy saving 
targets is questionable. Article 7 of the 
EU’s Energy Eciency Directive (EED) 
explicitly allows the Member States to 
include distributors and suppliers of en-
ergy with binding energy saving targets 
in their energy saving policy (so-called 
“Energy Eciency Obligation Schemes”; 
cf. European Commission 2017). In Eu-
rope (in contrast to 24 states in the 
USA), this is only used in 14 countries 
and mostly to a modest extent, but it has 
been quite successful, like in Denmark, 
France and Italy. Germany has some 
catching up to do. As intelligent and nec-
essary as binding incentives for energy-
saving programmes may be, in Germany, 
the lobby immediately swings the ideo-
logical club of dirigisme and—due to 
German history—of central administra-
tion. This ignores the fact that a cost re-
covery mechanism and incentive regula-
tion (guaranteed yield for the 
programme costs of successful energy 
saving programmes of energy supply 
companies) can ensure that energy sup-
pliers can also benefit from the imple-
mentation of such programmes by their 
customers.
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Strengthening polycentric governance 
in e  ciency policies
The framework set by EU-wide and re-
spective national policies must be sup-
ported by regional/local energy agen-
cies, business networks, consumer 
advice, forms of citizen participation 
and citizen financing (e.g. local sustain-
ability funds in conjunction with savings 
banks). Regional economic and social 
councils could play an important role in 
this. The energetic refurbishment of ex-
isting buildings in the cities and munici-
palities of all EU Member States re-
quires, in addition to a national funding 
programme (see below), responsible re-
gional/municipal centres (“building 
agencies”) that control the process and 
mobilise public participation.
The EU should also encourage and sup-
port nation states to set up national en-
ergy eciency agencies to which parlia-
ments delegate process responsible for 
the design, governance, coordination, 
promotion and evaluation of energy ef-
ficiency policies. These agencies need 
adequate stang and, as far as possible, 
their own resources for incentives and 
programmes (cf. Wuppertal Institute 
2013).
National Future Programs Energy 
E  cient Building Modernization 
It is undisputed that the implementation 
of an almost CO2-free building stock by 
2050 and the necessary increase in the 
annual energy-related building refur-
bishment rate (at least a doubling) re-
quires not only considerable additional 
private investment but also an extensive 
and reliable public funding programme 
over the long term. Although the Ger-
man KfW programme (cf. KfW 2018) is 
regarded as exemplary worldwide, the 
amount of funding—currently EUR 2 
billion per year—is not sucient. At this 
point, it must be pointed out that the 
evaluation of the KfW programmes iden-
tified an enormous leverage eect and a 
high self-financing rate (almost budget 
neutral). This means that the budget 
funds to finance the programmes have 
triggered private investments with a lev-
erage eect of more than 10 times, 
which through multiplier eects (e.g. 
more orders, more profits, more wages) 
have also led to higher tax revenues and 
considerable employment eects (cf. 
Prognos 2013). 
Massive start-up financing must be com-
bined with clearly defined objectives and 
conditions, because the energy-ecient 
refurbishment of existing buildings in 
rented housing, which is necessary for 
terms of climate policy, is not used as a 
pretext for inappropriate rent increases, 
luxury refurbishment, the expulsion of 
old tenants, and gentrification of neigh-
bourhoods. The ideal way would be to 
promote only “warm-rent neutral” reno-
vations (i.e., the increase in the cold 
rent through the allocation of energy-
relevant renovation investments must 
not exceed the resulting reduction in en-
ergy cost). However, it is controversial 
under which conditions and to what ex-
tent warm rent neutrality can generally 
be achieved.
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CO2 tax
A cross-sectoral core element of climate 
protection policy is that the exorbitant 
damage caused by CO2 emissions is tak-
en into account as far as possible, 
through a CO2 tax or an emissions trad-
ing system, in the operational cost ac-
counting of the polluters. The Federal 
Environment Agency (UBA 2019) esti-
mates the externalised environmental 
costs from the combustion of fossil fuels 
in the transport, electricity and heating 
sectors to be around €130 billion per 
year between 2006 and 2014. Electricity 
from lignite would, therefore, have to 
cost an additional 10.75 cents/kWh, and 
electricity from hard coal an additional 
8.94 cents/kWh if the external environ-
mental costs caused by this were consid-
ered. 
According to the World Bank report, 
there were 47 CO2 pricing initiatives 
worldwide in 2017, including 24 emis-
sions trading systems and 23 national 
CO2 taxes (The World Bank et al. 2017). 
In Europe alone, there are 15 countries 
(including Switzerland) that have intro-
duced a CO2 tax in addition to the Euro-
pean Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-
ETS). Many eorts to achieve 
appropriate CO2 pricing within the 
framework of the EU ETS and in the 
non-ETS area have so far failed due to 
resistance from German governments 
and various interest groups. This is a po-
sition that can no longer be sustained for 
long.  
The various attempts to reform the ETS 
and to introduce a general CO2 tax can-
not be presented here. It seems impor-
tant that, in general, CO2 prices in Eu-
rope should be as uniform as possible for 
all fossil energies in all sectors (includ-
ing non-ETS) and that socially undesir-
able negative eects, such as in Switzer-
land, should be compensated for by 
revenue. 
The cornerstones of a CO2 price reform 
presented by two representatives of in-
stitutes with dierent research orienta-
tions (Potsdam Institute for Climate Im-
pact Research (PIK) and the Rheinisch 
Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschafts-
forschung (RWI)) (Edenhofer and 
Schmidt 2018b) may also have a major-
ity in the Federal Government. The au-
thors demand a minimum price in the 
EU ETS of initially 20€/t CO2 which 
should rise to 35€/t CO2 by 2030. The 
aim is a European country alliance (a 
“coalition of the willing”; see also the 
Macron proposal below), which is also 
prepared to oset any dierence from 
the agreed minimum price through an 
additional flexible national CO2 tax. In 
addition, a corresponding “CO2 signal” 
is to be introduced in the non-ETS sec-
tors (transport, heat) by Germany, 
France and other EU states reforming 
their energy taxes in the direction of a 
uniform CO2 price. This could then re-
duce the electricity tax to a minimum, 
which in any case creates the wrong in-
centives by taxing electricity from re-
newable energies, as well as electricity 
from coal or gas. With a uniform CO2 
price of 20€/t CO2, for example, there 
would be a surcharge on the previous 
tax of 4.6 cents/l petrol for petrol and 
5.2 cents/l diesel for diesel. The propos-
al is also interesting because, for the first 
time, the distributional eects are also 
to be taken into account in “shaping 
structural change”. However, the pro-
posal remains vague here, in that “a 
lump sum per capita transfer to redis-
tribute the additional tax revenue to the 
population is (should be) considered” 
(ibid. p. 6). In addition, “it should be ex-
plored how regional structural change 
can be cushioned and new prospects for 
economic prosperity opened up without 
repeating the mistakes of the past” (ibid. 
p. 6). 
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7.4 Making the most of 
the EU’s energy and climate 
policy framework
In addition to these elements of a policy 
mix, which can mostly be implemented 
at national level, it is also important to 
make extensive use of the existing EU 
legal framework. The focus is on four 
strategies (cf. also National Academy of 
Sciences Leopoldina et al. 2018):
E ectively implement 
governance regulation
Member States are encouraged to eec-
tively implement the Integrated National 
Energy and Climate Plans (iNEK plans). 
In order to do this eectively, the con-
tents of the iNEK plans should be incor-
porated into national legislation. In or-
der to consolidate the Commission’s 
vague requirement for public participa-
tion in the preparation of the iNEK 
plans, the Member States should make 
participation possibilities binding. With-
in the framework of the Federal Climate 
Protection Act, guidelines should, there-
fore, be laid down for the participation 
of citizens. To mobilise active stakehold-
er participation at a state level, for ex-
ample, scenario-based stakeholder dia-
logues with scientific support, such as 
the preparation of the climate protection 
plan/law in NRW, have proven their 
worth (cf. Schepelmann 2018).
Sanction non-compliance with 
the Governance Regulation
Although sanctioning measures are not 
foreseen in the Governance Regulation, 
non-compliance could lead to possible 
sanctions through a link with the Struc-
tural Funds. This would allow the Euro-
pean Union to apply sanctions that go 
beyond the government regulation and 
make them more binding. To this end, 
financial support from the Structural 
Funds would have to be linked to the 
achievement of the climate protection 
targets or compliance with the Commis-
sion’s recommendations if the Member 
States fail to achieve them. In addition, 
it would be possible, for example, to 
grant environmental associations the 
right to take legal action under the 
Aarhus Convention. 
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Accompanying the governance regu-
lation with pioneering alliances
The Governance Regulation should be 
flanked by pioneering alliances between 
the EU Member States willing to cooper-
ate (“Alliance of the willing”) and third 
countries, where appropriate. Alliances 
for CO2 pricing and a coal phase-out are 
conceivable, for example. In the case of 
a CO2 price alliance, a minimum CO2 
price for all sectors within the alliance 
states would be agreed which would be 
higher than the ETS price. Coordination 
with the European Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS) is necessary to prevent 
a waterbed eect—emissions that are 
saved at one point are additionally add-
ed at another. This could be done by de-
leting certificates.
Extended mandate for 
existing EU funds 
The Social-Ecological Transformation 
Fund of the Energy Transition should be-
come a key element for the promotion of 
social-ecological transformation and for 
the start-up financing of new fields of 
business and innovation. One possibility 
would be to combine the objectives of 
climate protection and structural policy 
and thus also use funds from the Euro-
pean Structural and Investment Fund 
(ESI). The new version of the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 
also provides support for regions aect-
ed by structural change. The ESI Fund 
can also be used to promote cross-re-
gional funding. By linking these funds, 
joint energy and climate protection pro-
jects could be supported (Deutscher 
Naturschutzring (DNR) 2019), as called 
for by the Committee on Regional Devel-
opment of the European Parliament.
Cooperation with national funds
What is needed is close cooperation with 
national transformation funds such as 
those proposed by the German Advisory 
Council on Global Change (WBGU 
2018). WBGU calls for the establishment 
of “Sovereign Wealth Funds for Timely
Structural Change on Climate Compat-
ibility”: “The Transformation Funds 
should accelerate the implementation of 
climate and sustainability goals through 
investments and participation in key in-
dustries and use the profits achieved for 
the early and anticipatory shaping of 
time-consistent processes of structural 
change” (ibid. p. 4). WBGU’s financing 
proposal is also innovative: “The volume 
of the transaction fund should be built 
up by GHG pricing, supplemented by in-
come from a reformed inheritance or es-
tate tax” (ibid. p. 4). The WBGU contin-
ues to advocate “the establishment of a 
transaction fund as jointly as possible at 
EU level, possibly initially only in a small 
group of EU countries” (ibid. p. 36). As 
early as 2017, the European Parliament 
had also pleaded for the establishment 
of a just-transition fund from the auc-
tioning proceeds of emission certificates 
“with the aim of cushioning the eects 
of decarbonisation on the labour mar-
ket” (cf. ibid. p. 36; European Parlia-
ment 2017). In the summary of the par-
liamentary proposal of 2017, it says: “A 
modernisation fund will help to upgrade 
energy systems in the lower-income 
Member States, and an innovation fund 
will provide financial support for renew-
able energy, carbon capture, and storage 
and low-carbon innovation projects. 
MEPs also propose a “just transition 
fund”, pooling auction revenues to pro-
mote skill formation and reallocation of 
labour aected by the transition of jobs 
in a decarbonising economy” (ibid.).
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as a driver of a European
In his speech “Initiative for Europe” at 
the Sorbonne in September 2017, Presi-
dent Macron also mentions “Europe as a 
pioneer of eective and balanced environ-
mental change” (Macron 2017)6 and 
calls for the introduction of a fair mini-
mum CO2 price within Europe—su-
ciently high to cover the costs of change 
(Macron 2017 p. 7) and e.g. to provide 
aid to regions aected by structural 
change. For such a change, a European 
energy market is necessary, as is the will 
and the promotion of a connection of 
the electricity transmission grids in or-
der to let renewable energies benefit the 
whole of Europe and also French nuclear 
energy. A medium-term solution to the 
nuclear energy question is, therefore, the 
litmus test for the feasibility of a Franco-
German Energy Transition Alliance.
8.1 The nuclear energy question: a 
resolvable point of contention 
In 2015, France adopted an energy tran-
sition law which contained a CO2 reduc-
tion target for 2050 of 75% (based on 
1990), a reduction of the share of nu-
clear power to 50% by 2025, a share of 
renewable energy of 32% by 2030, and a 
reduction in final energy consumption of 
50% by 2050. In November 2018, Presi-
dent Macron corrected an essential as-
pect of this programme: the share of nu-
clear power is to fall to 50% in 2035, 
and not in 2025. The Fessenheim nucle-
ar power plant is to be decommissioned 
in 2022 and another 14 of the oldest nu-
clear power plants by 2035. However, 
there is no talk of a nuclear phase-out. 
EDF is even to present plans for a pos-
sible new building by 2021. This has a 
long tradition: French governments have 
maneuvered the country into a fatal 
path dependency on nuclear energy with 
their forced expansion of nuclear energy, 
which was also militarily motivated.
There are also alternatives. Analyses 
show how France, despite this dilemma 
of strong nuclear path dependence 
through forced energy saving, behav-
ioural change (suciency) and massive 
expansion of renewable energies, can 
combine forced climate protection by 
2050 with complete decarbonisation 
and the phase-out of nuclear energy by 
2035. The “négaWatt scenario” (cf. As-
sociation négaWatt 2017) calculates for 
a sustainable energy future for France by 
2050 the results of halving final energy 
consumption, increasing the expansion 
of onshore and oshore wind energy to 
67 GW and also increasing PV capacity 
to 140 GW. France’s CO2 emissions 
would then be almost zero, the rest be-
ing absorbed by biogenic carbon sinks. 
Despite the almost doubling of the nec-
essary investments for the energy transi-
tion compared to a “Business-as-usual” 
path, the négaWatt scenario is also eco-
nomically more advantageous due to the 
savings in energy costs and would create 
about 500,000 additional jobs by 2050 
through employment-intensive branches 
of the energy transition. It is interesting 
to note that not only the eects of a suf-
ficiency policy are analysed and quanti-
fied, but also in the sense of a “circular 
economy”, the decoupling of resource 
consumption: “The growth of repairing, 
recycling and reusing activities can halve 
raw material needs, even if the develop-
ment of renewables that will need some 
resources is taken into account” (Asso-
ciation négaWatt 2017 p. 3). A coordi-
nated French and German energy transi-
tion could, with a global signal eect, 
prove that the joint nuclear and coal 
phase-out is socially and economically 
feasible.
The neighbouring countries Germany and France are the European countries with the largest 
primary energy consumption, followed by Italy when Great Britain leaves (EEA 2018). In 2016, 
the combined Franco-German energy share was just over a third of the EU’s total. Is this share 
and the portfolio of energy policy commonalities su  cient as a “critical mass” to establish a 
Franco-German Energy Transition Alliance? Sure, it’s not, but it’s worth a try5. 
––––––––
8. Franco-German alliance 
   energy transition?
    
5  The background of the Gilets Jaunes (“Yellow 
West”) movement and its demands cannot be 
discussed here; cf. on the concrete development 
of energy and climate policy under Macron also 
Hennicke et al. (2019).y.
6 It refers to studies which can only prove the 
control e  ciency of a CO2 price from a price 
between 25 and 30 € per ton of CO2.
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8.2 Aachen Treaty on 
Franco-German Cooperation
With the Treaty of Aachen signed in Jan-
uary 2019 (cf. Federal Government of 
Germany 2019), the governments of 
Germany and France intend to raise re-
lations between the two states to a new 
level. 
In two articles, the Treaty of Aachen 
makes statements on energy and climate 
policy, but it avoids controversial issues 
and remains comparatively general. In 
Article 18, the Parties undertake to take 
climate protection into account in all 
policy areas and to conduct regular gov-
ernment consultations on the subject. 
Article 19 contains the Memorandum of 
Understanding to “strengthen the insti-
tutional framework for financing, pre-
paring and implementing joint projects, 
in particular in the fields of infrastruc-
ture, renewable energy and energy e-
ciency”. Whether it is possible to find a 
common position on the minimum CO2 
price demanded by Macron or on the 
role of nuclear power in the future Euro-
pean energy mix depends on the politi-
cal will, but also on the pressure of civil 
society in both countries. There is hope 
that both countries can build on a long 
tradition of cooperation. 
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9. European 
To be successful, such a dialogue has 
many prerequisites: Continuity and sci-
entific foundation is needed (like the 
study programmes of German commis-
sions of inquiry), scientific policy advice 
should be independent, but policy-ori-
ented, and mutual, respectful learning 
from one another, instead of a teaching 
certificate, is a basic prerequisite. Since 
2016, the German-Japanese Energy 
Transition Council has had good experi-
ence in this area (see GJETC 2018).
It is important to build up the coopera-
tion activities also envisaged within the 
framework of the Aachen Treaty on the 
basis of transparent stakeholder dia-
logues and public hearings. At least rep-
resentatives of industry, trade unions 
and environmental organisations must 
be involved.
As shown above, the Federation of Ger-
man Industries (BDI) also sees the eco-
nomic opportunities of climate protec-
tion and energy transition as positive for 
Germany today. The BDI now also recog-
nises that these opportunities could be 
better exploited not against Europe, but 
within the framework of a more inte-
grated Europe without the dominance of 
German economic interests, and for the 
benefit of all Member States (forsa et al. 
2019).
A Franco-German innovation alliance 
involving “green” industries and acceler-
ating climate protection and energy 
transition in both countries would con-
tribute to making the concrete utopia of 
Europeanizing energy transition a reality.
So, can a Franco-German alliance become the driving force behind the Europeanisation of 
energy transition? In order to be able to answer the question with “yes”, France would have 
to go further in the direction of risk minimisation (gradual phasing out of nuclear energy), 
and Germany in the direction of decarbonisation (gradual phasing out of coal). Why not 
engage in a result-oriented “energy transition” dialogue in both countries within the 
framework of long-term Franco-German cooperation on “Just Transition”?
––––––––
   outlook
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The “other America” has always existed 
and has moved in many states (e.g. Cali-
fornia), in thousands of cities, in numer-
ous corporate alliances and in civil soci-
ety against and because of Trump in a 
more ambitious direction of climate and 
resource protection. 
In the U.S., for example, a movement is 
establishing under the keyword “Green 
New Deal”. It has received great media 
attention through a “resolution” tabled 
by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the new 
representative in the House of Repre-
sentatives, at the beginning of February 
2019. Democratic Senator Ed Markey 
and other leading Democrats support 
the resolution. “81% of Americans are 
taken with the idea” (Frankfurter Rund-
schau, 12.2.2019). The resolution is not 
yet based on a sophisticated and calcu-
lated programme and is more of a “man-
ifesto”. 
With its call for ambitious climate pro-
tection, the manifesto refers to the IPCC 
Special Report on the 1.5 centigrade tar-
get of October 2018 (IPCC 2018). At the 
same time, it claims for the proposed 
Green New Deal that it “represents a 
new national, social, industrial and eco-
nomic mobilisation on a scale not seen 
since World War II and the New Deal 
era. This oers a “historic opportunity” 
to create millions of well-paid jobs, bring 
unprecedented prosperity and economic 
security, and counter systemic injustices 
(cf. ibid., p.4).
With “systemic”, the resolution refers to 
the disproportionate impact of climate 
change, air pollution and environmental 
degradation on “...native people, black 
neighbourhoods, migrant communities, 
deindustrialised regions, depopulated 
rural communities, the poor, the low-
income workers, women, the elderly, the 
homeless, the disabled and the youth” 
(ibid., p. 4).
The resolution, thus, combines the social 
and ecological issues in a rigorousness 
that has not been seen in any ocial 
government paper at EU level or in any 
Member State in Europe to date. Presi-
dent Donald J. Trump tried to nip this 
frontal attack on his politics in the bud 
with mockery and derision. And the un-
realistic demand of the resolution for a 
CO2-free American electricity generation 
within 10 years (!) uses political and me-
dia demagogues in the USA to disavow 
the seriousness and political power of 
the “manifesto”. But the enormous pub-
lic response to the resolution shows that 
the MEP has hit a political nerve in a 
torn and post-democratised country. No 
one expects that such a program will 
find fast majorities in the United States. 
But the content and the movement trig-
gered by the resolution is also an impor-
tant signal for Europe: not only “green” 
European and American industries, but 
a broad-based socio-ecological move-
ment could accelerate the future project 
“Energy Transition” and, thus, also give 
a new, truly sustainable content to a Eu-
ropean-Atlantic partnership. Dreams are 
possible – aren’t they?
The European energy transition must also be seen in a global context; it can be slowed down 
and spurred on by developments in other metropolitan areas. A fi nal glance at the USA may help 
one to grasp. This view is often clouded today because a political will-o’-the-wisp, like President 
Donald J. Trump, attracts a lot of media attention and gives the wrong impression that the U.S. 
is a nation full of ignoramuses and of climate change deniers. Far from it!  
––––––––
10. Epilogue: 
          Transatlantic Dream   
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